I study a multilateral sequential bargaining model among risk averse players in which the players may differ in their probability of being selected as the proposer and the rate at which they discount future payoffs. For games in which agreement requires less than unanimous consent, I characterize the set of stationary subgame perfect equilibrium payoffs. With this characterization, I establish the uniqueness of the equilibrium payoffs. For the case where the players have the same discount factor, I show that the payoff to a player is nondecreasing in his probability of being selected as the proposer. For the case where the players have the same probability of being selected as the proposer, I show that the payoff to a player is nondecreasing in his discount factor. This generalizes Eraslan [2002] by allowing the players to be risk averse. * This paper is prepared for the special issue of International Journal of Economic Theory in honor of Andy McLennan. I would like to thank Andy for his mentoring and friendship over the years, and for thinking of me as the guest editor for the special issue. I would also like to thank Metin Uyanık for a very helpful conversation which inspired the proof of Lemma A.2, and to
Introduction
In their influential work, Baron and Ferejohn [1989] present legislative bargaining game with risk neutral players. 1 In each period, one of the players is randomly selected to make a proposal as to how to divide a fixed pie and agreement requires the consent of a simple majority, otherwise, the process is repeated until agreement is reached with payoffs discounted geometrically at a common rate for all players. Baron and Ferejohn [1989] show that any division of the pie can be supported as a subgame perfect equilibrium if there are at least 5 players and the players are sufficiently patient. In light of this result, they restrict attention to stationary strategies. While in their model they allow for the probabilities with which players are selected to be the proposer to differ, they only establish the uniqueness of the stationary subgame perfect equilibrium payoffs when the players have equal recognition probabilities. Baron and Ferejohn [1989] also show with an example that when the players have different probabilities of being selected as proposer, the equilibrium need not be unique. In particular, they construct an example with a continuum of equilibria. However, in this example all the equilibria yield the same payoffs.
In Eraslan [2002] , I extend Baron and Ferejohn [1989] model to general q-quota agreement rules, allow the discount factors to differ across players and show that the vector of stationary subgame perfect equilibrium payoffs is unique for general recognition probabilities. 2 The model I consider in this paper generalizes Eraslan [2002] by allowing risk averse players with all players having the same concave utility functions. As in Eraslan [2002] , I first establish certain monotonicity properties of the equilibrium payoffs. I show that, when the players have a common discount factor, the equilibrium payoffs are monotone nondecreasing in the recognition probabilities. Furthermore, for the case where the players have equal recognition probabilities, I show that the equilibrium payoffs are monotone nondecreasing in the discount factors. 3 The proof approach I use is similar to the one Eraslan [2002] , the main 1 See Eraslan and McLennan [2013] for a survey of the large literature building on Baron and Ferejohn [1989] .
2 Kalandrakis [2014] provides an alternative approach to recover uniqueness result of Eraslan [2002] by characterizing equilibria in terms of two variables which satisfy a pair of piecewise linear equations, and Eraslan and McLennan [2013] provide an alternative proof in a more general model with arbitrary winning coalitions by showing that there is a unique connected component of equilibria all sharing the same vector of continuation payoffs.
3 As was pointed out by Colin Stewart (personal communication) (cf. Yıldırım [2007] ), this assertion is not true in Eraslan [2002] . This issue is studied in detail by Kawamori [2005] ). The reason that the assertion is correct here is because in this paper I define equilibrium payoff as the discounted payoff of the continuation game, whereas in Eraslan [2002] , I define it as the undiscounted payoff of the continuation game. Obviously there is a one-to-one relationship between the two difference is a technical lemma (Lemma A.2). I also add a step that was missing in Eraslan [2002] but was not noticed until now. 4 The model is a special case of Banks and Duggan [2000] who establish the existence of stationary subgame perfect equlibria when the set of alternatives is multidimensional and players are risk averse. However, they do not establish the uniqueness of the equilibrium payoffs. This model is also related to model in Harrington [1990] who considers a legislative bargaining model with risk averse players potentially with different levels of risk aversion but with identical recognition probabilities and identical discount factors. He shows the uniqueness of equilibrium payoffs when the preferences of the players are not "too heterogeneous."
The paper is organized as follows. The next section introduces the model and characterizes the set of stationary subgame perfect equilibrium payoffs, Section 3 establishes certain monotonicity properties of the equilibrium payoffs, Section 4 proves the uniqueness of stationary subgame perfect equilibrium payoffs and Section 5 concludes.
Model
The agents in the set N := {1, . . . , n} bargain over the division of a pie of size 1 according to the following protocol. At the beginning of each period until agreement is reached there is a random determination of a proposer. The probability that agent i is selected to be the proposer, denoted by p i , is called i's recognition probability. Let p := (p 1 , . . . , p n ) be the vector of recognition probabilities. Of course I require that each p i is nonnegative. I also assume that n i=1 p i = 1. The proposer selects a proposal from the set X := { x ∈ [0, 1] n : n i=1 x i ≤ 1 } of feasible allocations. There is a random determination of an ordering of the agents, after which the agents each vote for or against the proposal, with each agent seeing the votes of other agents in the ordering before selecting her own vote. If at least q ∈ {1, . . . , n} players including the proposer vote for the proposal, then the proposal is implemented, ending the game. Otherwise the process is repeated in the next period. The utility for agent i if the proposal x is implemented in period t is δ t i u(x i ) where δ = (δ 1 , . . . , δ n ) ∈ (0, 1) n is a vector of discount factors. I assume u(0) = 0, u is concave and strictly increasing. If agreement is never reached, then each agent's utility is zero.
Due to space limitations, I omit a formal definition of stationary subgame perfect payoffs. 4 See Lemma 3. equilibrium (SSP) and a formal existence result. The definition in the Appendix of Eraslan and McLennan [2013] and existence result (Theorem 3) in Eraslan [2002] can be extended in a straightforward way to the game studied here with risk averse players. In what follows, I define the SSP equilibrium payoffs directly. First note that in equilibrium, when the equilibrium SSP continuation payoff vector 5 is v = (v 1 , . . . , v n ), player i and rejects the offer x ∈ X if u(x i ) < v i and accepts it if u(x i ) ≥ v i . 6 Thus, given a payoff vector v, any proposal player j makes with positive probability in equilibrium can be written as
Note that when player j is the proposer, he is indifferent among all the proposals in the support of his equilibrium strategy. Consider now the solutions to the following problem:
(1)
This differs from the original problem because its minimizers correspond to mixed proposals rather than pure proposals. Clearly, if r j (v) is a solution to this problem, then one can represent it as the weighted average of the solutions to the original problem for some weights.
Thus, using the one-shot deviation principle, one can represent the equilibrium payoffs as
for all j, where r j (v) = (r j1 (v), . . . , r jn (v)) solves (1) for all j. In summary, v = (v 1 , . . . , v n ) is an SSP equilibrium payoff vector if and only if it satisfies (2) for all j.
Given an SSP payoff vector v and the corresponding matrix of offer probabilities [r ij (v)], let w i (v) denote the cost of the cheapest coalition (excluding the cost of his 5 In what follows I refer to a continuation payoff vector simply as a payoff vector. 6 Here I assume without loss of generality that player i accepts an offer when indifferent. To see, suppose to the contrary that player i rejects an offer x with u(x i ) = v i with positive probability. If there is no player j who makes an offer x with u(x i ) = v i with positive probability in equilibrium, then clearly player i's decision when indifferent is irrelevant, and hence, there is another equilibrium which is payoff equivalent to the original equilibrium in which player i accepts any offer x with u(x i ) = v i with probability one. If instead there is some player j who makes an offer x with u(x i ) = v i with positive probability, then player j can increase his payoff by slightly increasing x i and decreasing x j . own vote) when i is the proposer, and let µ i (v) denote the probability that player i is in the winning coalition when he is not the proposer. Formally,
In equilibrium, we must have
Consequently the implicit assumption I have made that there is no delay in equilibrium is self consistent. One can also show that there is no equilibrium with delay (see Theorem 1 in Banks and Duggan [2000] ).
Monotonicity of SSP Payoffs
In this section, I show that any SSP payoff vector must satisfy certain monotonicity conditions. These conditions are used in the next section to establish the uniqueness of SSP payoffs. Throughout this section I enumerate N as {i 1 , . . . , i n } such that
Thus, in equilibrium, the following conditions must hold. First,
Third, using (5) and (6), we can write (4) as
Proposition 1. Let v be an SSP payoff vector and let {i 1 , . . . , i n } be an enumeration of N such that
Note that, when the players have a common discount factor, δ j p j ≤ δ k p k if and only if
and both of these conditions are equivalent to p j ≤ p k . Thus, parts (iii) and (iv) of Theorem 1 imply that when the players have a common discount factor, the SSP payoffs are monotone nondecreasing in the recognition probabilities.
Corollary 1. Let v be an SSP payoff vector and suppose δ i = δ for all i ∈ N . Then,
Similarly, when the players have equal recognition probabilities, δ j p j ≤ δ k p k if and only if
and both of these conditions are equivalent to δ j ≤ δ k . Thus, parts (iii) and (iv) of Theorem 1 imply that when the players have equal recognition probabilities, the SSP payoffs are monotone nondecreasing in the discount factors.
Corollary 2. Let v be an SSP payoff vector and suppose p i = 1/n for all i ∈ N .
Uniqueness of SSP payoffs
In what follows, let v andv denote two SSP equilibrium payoff vectors. Denote the corresponding disbursement vectors by w = (w 1 , . . . , w n ) andw = (w 1 , . . . ,w n ) respectively, and denote the corresponding inclusion probabilities by µ = (µ 1 , . . . , µ n ) andμ = (μ 1 , . . . ,μ n ). Let {i 1 , . . . , i n } be an enumeration of N such that
and let {j 1 , . . . , j n } be an enumeration of N such that
I first show that it is possible to find a player whose equilibrium payoff is equal to the qth lowest payoff under both equilibria. Furthermore, the monotonicity results I established in the previous section implies that there is some commonality in the ordering of the players according to their payoffs under the two equilibria. More precisely, it is not possible to have two players i and j with i being among the cheapest players when the equilibrium payoff vector is v but among the more expensive players when the payoff vector isv, while the opposite is true for j.
By Lemma 1, without loss of generality we can choose i q = j q = q, and assume that
In other words, if i is not among the most expensive players when the equilibrium payoff vector is v, then he cannot be among the most expensive players when the payoff vector isv either. The next result shows that if player i is included as a coalition partner when the equilibrium payoff vector is v more often than he is included when the equilibrium payoff vector isv, then there must be another player j for which the opposite is true: player i is included as a coalition partner when the equilibrium payoff vector is v less often than he is included when the equilibrium payoff vector isv. The fact that other players choose their coalitions partners to maximize their own payoffs in turn implies restrictions on the equilibrium payoff vectors of players i and j relative to player q under the two equilibria.
I next show that if a player is among the most expensive players when the equilibrium payoff vector is v, then he cannot be among the cheapest players when the equilibrium payoff vector isv.
By assumption (*) and Lemma 3, without loss of generality, we can assume that, v i ≤ v q andv i ≤v q for all i ≤ q, and v i ≥ v q andv i ≥v q for all i ≥ q. In particular,
. Our proof exploits the fact that if v =v, then there must exists players i and j such that either (8) or (9) must hold. By Lemma 3, we can strengthen these expressions
if any of the inequalities in (10) is strict, thenv q =v j .
Recall that a player's equilibrium payoff is determined by two endogenous factors: the cost of his coalition when he is the proposer, and the probability of being included in others' coalitions. The next result implies that the latter factor does not play a role in determining whether a player receives a higher equilibrium payoff under one equilibria relative to his equilibrium payoff in another equilibrium. In particular, if the cost of a player's coalition goes down, then his payoff must go up. Furthermore, if his probability of being included in others' coalitions also goes down, then the change in his equilibrium payoff is bounded above by the changes in his utilities from the surplus he receives after paying off his coalition partners.
The remaining results also hold when we replace (v, w, µ) with (v,w,μ).
The next result extends previous result. In particular, the change in the equilibrium payoff of a player is bounded above by the changes in his utilities from the pie he receives after paying off his coalition partners regardless of how his probability of being included in others' coalitions changes.
The inequalities are strict if and only if w i >w i .
Using Lemma 6, we can show that the cost of winning coalition changes in the same direction for all players.
Lemma 7. For all i ∈ N , w i ≥w i if w q ≥w q . The inequality is strict if and only if w q >w q .
We are now ready to show that v =v. It suffices to prove thatw q = w q . By Lemma 7, this implies thatw i = w i for all i, and by Lemma 6 we havev i = v i for all i.
Suppose to the contrary thatw q = w q , and without loss of generality assume that w q > w q . Then, by Lemma 7,w i > w i for all i ∈ N . In particular, for i = 1, . . . q − 1, w i > w i . But by Lemma 6, this implies thatv i < v i for all i = 1, . . . , q − 1, which in turn implies thatw q = q−1
This contradiction proves the desired result and establishes the main result of the paper:
Theorem 1. If v andv are two SSP equilibrium payoffs then v =v.
Concluding remarks
In this paper I generalized the uniqueness result in Eraslan [2002] to a model with risk averse players who share identical utility functions, and am thereby led to two directions for future research. One is to allow general winning coalitions as in Eraslan and McLennan [2013] , and the other is to allow the players to have different utility functions. I hope to convince Andy to pursue these directions together.
Appendix
Lemma A.1. For any x, y with 0 < x < y, and 0 < x < y , if x < x and y < y , then u(x)−u(y)
Proof: Since u is concave and strictly increasing, its inverse is strictly convex. Thus
Let v be an SSP payoff vector and let {i 1 , . . . , i n } be an enumeration of N such that
Proof: (i) Since u is concave and strictly increasing, for any K > 0 we have,
By (7), we have 1 − w iq − u −1 (v iq ) > 0 since δ j p j ≤ 1 − δ j µ j (v). Thus the result follows.
(ii) If not, we obtain a contradiction since
where the first inequality follows from (7), the second inequality holds because u is strictly increasing, and the third inequality follows from part (i).
Proof of Proposition 1:
where the first line follows from (7), the second line follows from (5) and the assumption that δ j p j ≥ δ k p k , the third line follows from the fact that u is strictly increasing, and the fourth line follows from part (i) of Lemma A.3.
(ii): If
where the first line follows from (7), the second line follows from the fact that µ j = 1 − p j and µ k ≤ 1 − p k , and the assumption that
, and the third line follows from part (i) of Lemma A.3.
contradicting the assumption that δ j p j ≤ δ k p k .
(iv): Suppose to the contrary that v k < v j . If v iq ≥ v j , then by part (ii) of the proposition,
where the equality is by (7), and the last inequality follows from part (ii) of Lemma A.3. This again contradicts the assumption that
Proof of Lemma 1: We first prove part (ii). Suppose not. Then there exist k and k such that v k ≤ v iq < v k andv k ≤v jq <v k . The first set of inequalities implies δ k p k > δ k p k , and the second set of inequalities implies δ k p k < δ k p k by part (i) of Proposition 1, leading to a contradiction. To prove part (i), first partition N as
Similarly, defineN 1 ,N 2 andN 3 by replacing v withv and i q with j q . By part (ii), assume without loss of generality that,v k ≤v jq whenever v k ≤ v iq for all k ∈ N , which implies N 1 ∪ N 2 ⊆N 1 ∪N 2 . Suppose the assertion of part (i) of the lemma is not true, i.e, N 2 ∩N 2 = ∅. Then, it must be the case that N 2 ⊆N 1 . In particularv iq <v jq .
Note that N 1 ∩N 2 = ∅. If this were not the case, then there would exist k ∈ N such that v k < v iq andv k =v jq >v iq . But former inequality implies
and the latter set of inequalities implies
Since (N 1 ∪ N 2 ) ∩N 2 = ∅ and N 1 ∪ N 2 ⊆N 1 ∪N 2 , it must be the case that N 1 ∪ N 2 ⊆N 1 . But, by definition, #(N 1 ∪ N 2 ) ≥ q and #N 1 ≤ q − 1, leading to a contradiction. .
Proof of Lemma 2:
Let i ∈ N be such that µ i >μ i . Then there must exist at least one player j ∈ N with µ j <μ j , for otherwise at least one player is not making an optimal coalition choice when he is the proposer. Since µ i >μ i ≥ 0, it must be the case that v i ≤ v q by (5). Also, 1 − p i ≥ µ i >μ i impliesv i ≥v q by (5) again. Since v i ≤ v q , we also havev i ≤v q by (*), and thereforev i =v q . By a similar argument, we obtain v j ≥ v q andv j ≤v q . The proof of part (ii) is analogous.
Proof of Lemma 3: Suppose to the contrary that there exists i ∈ N with v i > v q andv i <v q . Then µ i = 0 <μ i = 1 − p i . We will show thatμ j ≥ µ j for all j ∈ N with v j ≤ v q which is a contradiction by Lemma 2.
For any j withv j <v q , this follows immediately sinceμ j = 1 − p j ≥ µ j . For any j withv j >v q , we have v j > v q by (*), and thereforeμ j ≥ 0 = µ j . Thus, it remains to show thatμ j ≥ µ j for any j withv j =v q and v j ≤ v q .
Note that δ i p i > δ j p j 1−δ j µ j for any j with v j ≤ v q . This follows by part (ii) of Lemma A.3 and (5) if v j < v q , and from (7) if v j = v q . Likewise, δ j p j > δ i p i 1−δ i µ i for any j withv j =v q by part (ii) of Lemma A.3 and (5). Now sincev q >v i , then for any j withv j =v q and v j ≤ v q we must have
implying thatμ j > µ j .
Proof of Lemma 4:
If v j > v q , then by Lemma 3, we must havev j ≥v q , and sō v q =v j . Suppose now v j ≥ v q > v i . Ifv q >v j , then we have a contradiction by part (ii) of Proposition 1. Thus,v q =v j .
Proof of Lemma 5: As stated in the main text, the results also hold when we replace (v, w, µ) with (v,w,μ). The proofs of these alternative statements are analogous, and we omit them to avoid repetition. (i): By (4),
The proof follows immediately by noting that at least one of the inequalities in the above expression is strict if
If v i >v i , there is nothing to prove, and so suppose v i ≤v i . Then, by (4),
Since w j = w i ≥w i ≥w j and µ j >μ j , by part (ii) of Lemma 5, we have 0 <v j − v j < u(1 −w j ) − u(1 − w j ). By Lemma A.2, this implies u −1 (v j ) − u −1 (v j ) < w j −w j . Since u is strictly increasing, we have u −1 (v j ) − u −1 (v j ) ≥ u −1 (v q ) − u −1 (v q ). Note also that w j −w j = w q −w q . Thus the term in brackets in (A12) is strictly positive, and therefore, we have u −1 (v i ) − u −1 (v i ) < w i −w i .
Case 2:v j =v q =v i and v i ≥ v q ≥ v j . By (6), we have w j ≥ w q = w i andw i =w j =w q . Then, w j ≥w j . Since µ j >μ j , we have 0 <v j − v j < u(1 −w j ) − u(1 − w j ) by part (ii) of Lemma 5. By Lemma A.2, this implies u −1 (v j ) − u −1 (v j ) < w j −w j ).
Using (6) again, we obtain
The result follows by noting that the term in the brackets is strictly positive.
To see that the inequalities are strict only if w i >w i , notice that, if w i =w i , then 0 ≤ u −1 (v i ) − u −1 (v i ) ≤ w i −w i = 0 which in turn implies that neither inequality can be strict.
Proof of Lemma 7: As stated in the main text, the results also hold when we replace (v, w, µ) with (v,w,μ). The proofs of these alternative statements are analogous, and we omit them to avoid repetition.
Recall that we assumed without loss of generality that v i ≥ v q andv i ≥v i for all i ≥ q and v i ≤ v q andv i ≤v i for all i ≤ q. Thus, the proof follows immediately by (6) if i ≥ q. So, let i < q. Then, v i ≤ v q andv i ≤v q and hence, from (6)
where the inequality follows from Lemma 6, and is strict if and only if w q >w q also by Lemma 6. Now if w i <w i , then 0 < u −1 (v i ) − u −1 (v i ) <w i − w i by Lemma 6 contradicting (A13). Hence, w i ≥w i and the inequality is strict if w q >w q by (A13). Finally, if w q =w q , thenv q = v q by Lemma 6 and hence, by (A13), w i −w i = u −1 (v i ) − u −1 (v i ). By Lemma 6 this is possible only if w i =w i .
